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PANEL 4: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
MODERATOR: LAUREN SUDEALL  
PANELISTS: DAN EPPS, GAIL HERIOT, AND CORINNA LAIN 
 
Professor Lauren Sudeall: We’re going to be transitioning a little 
bit in terms of topic now, and as you may have noticed, I’m not Eric 
Segall. I’m Lauren Sudeall. I’m on the faculty here at the Law 
School. I’m going to skip the longer introductions as has been done 
in the other panels just to save time. I’ll just tell you who we have up 
here on the stage. We have Dan Epps from the Washington 
University School of Law, Corinna Lain from the University of 
Richmond School of Law, and Gail Heriot from the University of 
San Diego School of Law. We have the perhaps unique and 
challenging task of weaving together multiple topics, not even just 
what’s listed on the agenda, but we’re going to sort of squeeze the 
death penalty in there, as well, as sort of a sub-topic of criminal 
procedure. 
Our format’s going to be a little different by virtue of having the 
Herculean task of doing that. We’re just going to sort of—I’ll spend a 
minute or two giving a little introduction, and then we’re going to go 
panelist by panelist, and I’ll ask a few questions, give a brief 
opportunity for others to chime in, and then we’ll try to reserve time 
at the end for Q and A. 
So, as I mentioned, we’re trying to knit together, or at least touch 
on, some pretty different areas here. But, perhaps we can draw some 
parallels and thinking about Justice Kennedy’s approach to these 
topics. In the context of the death penalty, Justice Kennedy certainly 
didn’t embrace abolition, but as in many of the other areas we’ve 
talked about today, he often provided the critical fifth vote in a 
number of important death penalty cases, including Roper v. 
Simmons, barring the death penalty for juveniles; Kennedy v. 
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Louisiana, barring the death penalty for non-homicide crimes; and 
joined Justice Stevens’ opinion in Atkins; but, he also joined the 
majority in upholding a number of lethal injection protocols. So, I 
think in some sense we see someone who didn’t want to strike the 
death penalty down altogether, certainly, but really was trying to be 
careful about demarcating the boundaries in which it could operate 
with a focus on sort of decency and a certain view of society. I know 
Corinna’s going to talk about the importance of dignity in the context 
of the death penalty. 
We have somebody who, for a long time, had never voted in favor 
of an affirmative action program but in Fisher v. Texas eventually 
changed his mind, upholding the university’s plan. I know Gail will 
talk about that. He also wrote the concurring opinion in Parents 
Involved, again threading the needle. That case involved voluntary 
school-integration plans. So, in trying to think about all these 
different issues and these two different areas of the law, I’ll at least 
put forth and certainly folks here can tell me if I’ve hit on anything of 
value, that I think we can think about Justice Kennedy as often trying 
to thread the needle and be very careful in trying to think about 
boundaries. But also, I think to some extent having this very 
aspirational view of society and maybe how society should be and 
maybe trying to reach that place of having that inform him in how he 
approached these different areas of the law, and I do think in some 
sense, maybe a certain idealism about society and at least where it 
should be, if not where it is today. 
I’m going to start with Dan to talk about criminal procedure. If you 
could just start off by maybe summarizing, again, in ten minutes or 
so, or less than that, Justice Kennedy’s approach to the field or 
maybe just hitting on a few highlights or cases that are of particular 
interest in that area. 
Professor Dan Epps: Sure. So, I’ve been spending a lot of time 
thinking about Justice Kennedy’s approach to criminal procedure and 
trying to come up with some themes. I think some of them are the 
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relentless anti-formalism that we’ve been talking about for the whole 
day. I don’t think he was particularly concerned with procedural rules 
for the sake of procedural rules. He was much more oriented toward 
substance in this field than straight up procedure. He cared about 
fairness but cared about fairness for particular ends. So, if you were 
someone coming in and saying, “Look, I’m a guilty person, but I 
didn’t get this exact procedure to which I was entitled under the 
Constitution,” he might not have been the best Justice for you. But if 
you’re coming in saying, “Something really unjust just happened to 
me,” you might have been in better shape. 
One thing I’ve been thinking about a lot is, and trying to figure 
out, is that he’s often called our most libertarian Supreme Court 
Justice in recent years, he has this big concern about liberty. I don’t 
see a liberty focus in crim pro nearly as much as you might expect. 
At the very least, I don’t see it in the sense of a traditional libertarian 
concern for the threat posed by the state. In his Fourth Amendment 
cases, which I’ll talk about in a little bit, he is sort of more deferential 
to the government. He is—I found him generally more deferential to 
political actors and police in general in crim pro than you might 
expect, given his jurisprudence in some other areas. 
In terms of his most important contributions, I think a lot of people 
are going to immediately go to the Eighth Amendment cases. I’m not 
going to talk about the capital cases, do not take the wind out of your 
sails, Corinna, but I’ll talk about some of the related cases which are 
Graham v. Florida, right. This is a case where the Court says you 
can’t impose life without parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders, 
and then it’s built on in Miller, which requires individualized 
sentencing for juvenile homicide offenders before they can get life 
without parole. Those are going to get a lot of billing when people 
are talking about him and the sort of criminal sphere, but even in the 
Eighth Amendment context, he’s not sort of a uniformly 
pro-defendant Justice. He writes a separate opinion in Harmelin v. 
Michigan sort of indicating some theoretical openness to Eighth 
Amendment challenges to terms-of-year sentences more generally, 
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not talking about the juvenile context, but there, ends up upholding a 
quite unjust sentence for a first-time drug offender. 
Interestingly, he seems to get sort of intrigued by some problems 
with criminal justice late in his career. He gives this speech in 2012 
to the ADA, where he talks about the dangers posed by corrections 
and how we need to care more for prisoners. But I don’t know if he 
has enough of an opportunity to flesh that out in his jurisprudence 
before he ends up leaving the Court. He does so in the juvenile 
context. He writes the opinion in Brown v. Plata, which is about the 
remedy for a long series of conceded Eighth Amendment violations 
in the California prison system, but it seemed like maybe there was 
more he wanted to do or might have wanted to do if you can imagine 
him staying on the court for ten years. One thing I’m drawn to is he 
has this weird opinion in Davis v. Ayala, which is the case that has 
literally nothing to do with solitary confinement, but it turns out that 
the defendant in that case had been in solitary confinement. Justice 
Kennedy asked a random question about it in oral argument and then 
wrote this whole concurrence saying, “This is a thing I might be 
interested in getting into,” and then that ends up being an unfinished 
legacy. 
Professor Sudeall: So, you mentioned earlier the Fourth 
Amendment—and we talked a little bit earlier in the day about the 
relationship between Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy. The Sixth 
Amendment and Fourth Amendment were areas where Justice Scalia 
was seen as being maybe unexpectedly defendant friendly, so would 
you say that he was more so than Justice Kennedy? We’ve also 
talked about areas in which the two of them really vehemently 
disagreed around certain issues. How did they play off each other in 
this context? 
Professor Epps: Yeah, I would say certainly a little bit, and I don’t 
want to overstate how much of a Fourth Amendment defender I think 
Justice Scalia was, because he talked a lot about the substance of the 
Fourth Amendment, but when it came down to remedies, I don’t 
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think he was really interested in doing a lot to meaningfully enforce 
the Fourth Amendment. But that said, when it came to the substance, 
I think Justice Scalia was more concerned with the Fourth 
Amendment than Justice Kennedy. Justice Scalia writes a very angry, 
and I thought quite effective, dissent in Maryland v. King, which is 
the case about whether you can DNA test arrestees. Justice Kennedy 
generally was okay with the drug testing. He wrote the Skinner and 
von Raab decisions. Justice Kennedy dissents in Carpenter, the 
recent case about whether it’s a Fourth Amendment search to get cell 
site location information. Justice Kennedy writes Hiibel v. Sixth 
Judicial District, which is about when you can question or arrest 
someone who just refuses to give their name. 
Justice Kennedy does write some pro-defendant Fourth 
Amendment cases, but not that many. This is where it gets to the 
point I was saying a second ago. You see in Justice Scalia, he does 
have this concern for the dangers of government. Whether it’s real, 
whether it’s just rhetorical, he really talks about that and seems to see 
that as a real threat and emphasizes that the Founders were worried 
about the dangers of government. I don’t see that concern that much 
in Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence. 
Professor Sudeall: So, if there is one or several ways in which you 
think his leaving the Court might change criminal procedure, what 
might that be, or might he not—might his departure not change that 
area of the law in a fundamental way? 
Professor Epps: I think it would be hard to imagine it won’t in some 
ways, and I think how it’s going to change the law and which 
direction it’s going to change the law in is going to depend on the 
issue. So, the sort of formalist issues, issues where the Constitution 
seems to dictate a certain kind of procedure but one that largely 
seems to serve to make it harder to get the bad guys, Justice Kennedy 
was usually with the government. In the Sixth Amendment context, 
Sixth Amendment sentencing, he was not a big fan of the Apprendi 
line. He wrote a lot of opinions trying to push back on that “Apprendi 
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Revolution.” Likewise, in the Confrontation Clause, I think he’s in 
the majority in Crawford but then later gets off the train and writes a 
bunch of dissents where he basically—the tenor of which is, “Why 
are we doing this? why are we insisting that people have the right to 
confront this particular accuser? This is just making it hard to get the 
bad guys.” 
I think a new Justice—Justice Kavanaugh if it turns out to be 
Justice Kavanaugh, we’ll find out very, very soon—may be a little bit 
more formalist in those lines and may draw more on Justice Scalia’s 
decisions. Justice Scalia really emphasized that “Look, we don’t get 
to just sort of assess for liability. We have to look at the procedure 
mandate in the constitution. If you didn’t get that, that’s the end of 
the story.” Justice Kennedy, I think he was more interested in saying, 
“Look, what’s really going on here? Is this going to make it harder to 
get the bad guys, or are people really getting screwed over?” I think 
those cases, the defendants are going to be better off. In other cases, 
like ineffective assistance of counsel cases, defendants might be 
worse off under a more formalist, conservative, originalist approach 
that someone like Justice—Judge Kavanaugh if he’s confirmed— 
would offer. Justice Kennedy, he wrote the opinions in Missouri v. 
Frye and Lafla v. Cooper, which are about ineffective assistance of 
counsel in the plea context. Those are cases where I think you really 
see him saying, “Look, what’s really going on here? Maybe that there 
are these formal arguments that this doesn’t quite work in this 
context, but look, let’s be real.” He in fact quotes Bill Stunz’s work, 
basically says, “Our system of criminal justice is a police system, and 
that’s what’s important, and we need to give people a fair procedure 
there.” I would imagine that’s not going to be something that more 
conservative, originalist-type Justices are going to push forward. 
Professor Sudeall: I want to give the two of you, if you want to 
chime in, or we could also transition. It’s a pretty seamless transition, 
as Dan highlighted. A big area for Justice Kennedy in criminal 
procedure was the Eighth Amendment, so maybe we could just move 
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to you to talk about—again if you could maybe summarize what his 
approach, if you can, to death penalty cases, had been. 
Professor Corinna Lain: Sure, and I will say, by way of Dan’s 
comments, I agree 100%. I’m not surprised, Dan, that you mention 
some Eighth Amendment cases, because when I think about Kennedy 
on criminal procedure, it’s sort of unremarkable, whereas in the death 
penalty area, it’s “Oh yeah, there’s a real strong thread here.” I’m 
reminded of a survey—2006, 2008 or so—and it listed Justice 
Kennedy as one of the top 10 most conservative justices.  That seems 
about right. Kennedy didn’t surprise us on criminal procedure. Scalia 
was much more interesting and much more surprising and had much 
more of a Libertarian thread on criminal procedure. Kennedy was 
more—there were some things that bothered him, and I think you 
nailed it, it was the basic fairness point—but otherwise, he wasn’t so 
distinctive. 
But in the Eighth Amendment context, he really is distinctive. 
Today, what we’ve heard thus far and what we’ll continue to hear 
about, is this dignity jurisprudence, or language of dignity that he 
had. That plays out in the purist form in the Eighth Amendment, 
because the Eighth Amendment doctrine was all about dignity well 
before Kennedy ever showed up. So, for the guy who really cares 
about dignity, and by the way I went back and looked, and during his 
confirmation proceedings, Kennedy was asked, “What are the sort of 
liberties that the Constitution protects? What do you consider under 
the concept of liberty?” And he says, “An abbreviated list are the 
essentials of the right to human dignity.”  Then he lists some things. 
He talks about harms to the person, injuries and anguish to the 
person, but the very first words out of his mouth are “the essentials of 
the right to human dignity.”  So this is something that was important 
to Kennedy from the start.  
And this is something that has been important in the Eighth 
Amendment from the start, or at least since 1958, when the Court 
decided Trop v. Dulles. There Chief Justice Warren is talking about 
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the Eighth Amendment and is breathing new life into the Eighth 
Amendment. He says, “The basic concept underlying the Eighth 
Amendment is nothing short of the dignity of man.”  So you can see 
dignity being a theme in the Eighth Amendment from the earliest 
time. Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall are talking about dignity 
when they vote to abolish the death penalty as it is then administered 
in Furman v. Georgia in 1972. The Supreme Court, Justice Stewart 
for the plurality, is talking about dignity when the Court brings back 
the death penalty in 1976.  In Woodson the Court says, “You can’t 
have an automatic death penalty. Why? Because that violates human 
dignity.” So you put the two together, and you’ve got the dignity 
doctrine for the dignity dude.  So you can expect to see this really 
strong thread here.  
It’s not to say, as Dan mentions, that Justice Kennedy wasn’t part 
of really some horrible decisions, especially at the beginning of his 
tenure on the Court. He was part of a pair of decisions in 1989 that 
said executing people who committed their crimes as juveniles was 
just fine, and executing offenders who had intellectual disabilities, 
then referred to as mentally retarded, was just fine. He was part of the 
majority in Herrera that said you need a constitutional violation to go 
with an actual innocence claim on habeas. He was part of the 
majority in Walton, where the Court said that even though the death 
penalty is supposed to be limited—it’s not supposed to be for just any 
murderer, it’s supposed to be for the worst of the worst—that it was 
okay if the aggravator was that the murder was cold-blooded.  I 
remember the dissent in that case saying, yeah but that means that the 
death penalty is for all but the contrite murderer saying, ‘I’m really 
sorry but I’m going to have to kill you’ and Kennedy is saying, “Eh, 
that’s limited.” 
So, he’s a part of some really quite dreadful death penalty 
decisions, especially in the early years. What’s interesting is that by 
the 2000s, Kennedy has  really taken a turn. He does have some blind 
spots to this day, particularly end game stuff—so he’s a reliable vote 
for denying stays. He’s a reliable vote for narrowing habeas review in 
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capital cases.  He’s a reliable vote to deny relief in the lethal injection 
cases.  
But otherwise, he really takes a turn in the 2000s. He changes his 
mind on the execution of juvenile offenders and the intellectually 
disabled.  He doesn’t write the opinion in Atkins but he later writes 
the opinion in Hall v. Florida where the court is striking down 
Florida’s very narrow conception of intellectual disability, and he 
talks about how the execution of the intellectually disabled is a 
violation of human dignity. He says this is just a blind rage. The 
death penalty is supposed to be for the worst of the worst and if the 
offender is intellectually disabled, then by definition they can’t be the 
worst. He says this is against this notion of human dignity. 
Then you have Roper v. Simmons. He writes the 5-4 decision to 
strike down the juvenile death penalty. Dan, I think you mentioned 
Graham, but there’s also Kennedy v. Louisiana, where Kennedy 
writes the decision invalidating the death penalty for rape of children 
who did not die.  And you mentioned Brown v. Plata. Each one of 
these decisions that he’s writing, he talks about dignity. It’s all over 
the place. What is the theme? It’s dignity. 
Professor Sudeall: Can I ask you, we didn’t plan this, but I have a 
question for the two of you. Why is it that this doesn’t translate over? 
Because death is at stake? Why does it not translate over into 
everyday interactions with the police, for example? Why does he not 
think about dignity in that? 
Professor Lain: I think that human dignity has this special meaning 
and valiance when you’re talking about the death penalty. I’m 
thinking of the Canadian Supreme Court decision that refused an 
extradition request in a capital case, and the Canadian Supreme Court 
says, “Even though we have this extradition agreement, we’re not 
going to honor it here. Why? Because the United States has the death 
penalty, and that’s the evisceration of human dignity.” Then you’ve 
got Pope Francis in 2015 who says, “We should abolish the death 
penalty. Why? Because every human being has an unalienable right 
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to human dignity.” The death penalty says, “You don’t have a right to 
be a living human being anymore. We are kicking you out of the 
human community.” The point is that there’s this residual dignity and 
humanness to every person that the death penalty takes away. I think 
there’s something very unique about that. Death is different. 
Professor Epps: Also, in these cases, though, it seems to be part of 
what’s important is the message society is sending more generally, 
because as you noted, even in the capital context, he doesn’t become 
a death penalty abolitionist late in his career. When he’s voting on all 
these stays and so forth, to win those cases they often break down 
along ideological lines. He’s almost always going to be with the 
conservative majority. He’s interested in making these big 
statements. Certain categories of defendants are just off limits, but it 
comes down to the way the law operates on its day-to-day operation, 
he’s less interested in really limiting things. 
Professor Lain: It reminds me of Justice Scalia, who was speaking 
in 2015, I think it was, and he said, “I wouldn’t be surprised if the 
Supreme Court gets rid of the death penalty all together.” He was 
clearly referring to Kennedy, because there were already four votes, 
but you needed Kennedy. I have wondered if Kennedy’s 
jurisprudence over time, well we didn’t get to see it play out, but I 
have wondered whether he would have been willing at some point to 
go all the way.  
I think Kennedy’s dignity doctrine had three meanings in the death 
penalty context. One was that the death penalty is uniquely degrading 
to human dignity, because you’re kicking a person out of the human 
community, and so you have to be very, very careful. Let’s be very, 
very careful about how we do that and who we do it to.  And maybe 
there was room there, if one cared about dignity in its strongest 
formulation, to go all the way.  We’ll just never know. 
The second meaning is this notion of excessively severe, 
disproportionate penalties that carries over to the non-death penalty 
context, where he’s saying, “Look, if the person is not the worst of 
10
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the worst, then what you have is society playing out its rage over this 
murder. That is just a blind rage, a brutalization.” And the Court talks 
about this some in Ford where the Court says you can’t execute the 
insane. But I think that the proportionality doctrine comes from that. 
Then the last thing that I think is he’s talking about is a sense of  
dignity of society and how we can’t treat offenders—we can’t treat 
brutal, vicious murderers like they treated their victims. Why can’t 
we do that? His view was you can’t just do unto others what they did 
to someone else, because you can’t stoop that low. It’s not because 
they don’t deserve it, it’s because civilized society shouldn’t set its 
standards by the people who are breaking the law and murdering 
people. I think that’s a piece of it too. 
Professor Sudeall: You brought up the possibility of the Court 
ending the death penalty, and so along those lines I’ll ask—I think 
many writing in this area seem to believe that there’s this inevitable 
decline or that we’re seeing this decline. I don’t know if I personally 
agree with that. I think it’s a little more nuanced, maybe because I 
also live in a part of the country where that is perhaps less true than 
others. So, with Justice Kennedy leaving the Court, what of that 
possibility? 
Professor Lain: It’s super interesting, and I’ve written about the 
death penalty collapsing under its own weight. With Kennedy off the 
Court, I think that really smart capital litigators are going to be even 
more careful about what they bring to the Court and whether they 
want to be bringing things to the Court, because you can make bad 
law. So, we might see less things going to the Court. Think about 
Furman v. Georgia—the death penalty was dying on its own. The 
Court stepped in and surely thought, “Oh we’re just shutting off the 
lights, everybody’s left the party,” and then you have this massive 
backlash. 
In some weird way, I think Kennedy may have laid down the path 
to abolition even though his dignity doctrine didn’t go all the way. 
He was the power behind the evolving standards of decency doctrine. 
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That doctrine looks at how many states have the death penalty, 
what’s happening with executions, what’s happening with death 
sentences? And those things are declining. We’ve had seven states in 
the last ten years get rid of the death penalty. Executions last year—
twenty-three in the country. In the country. I mean, ten years ago, 
fifteen years ago, Texas had forty-eight all by itself. And prosecutors 
are not asking for it as much. The prosecutors that were asking for it, 
they’re retiring, or they’re running for reelection, and they’re not 
getting reelected. I do think the death penalty is dying its own slow 
death, and that if you are a death penalty abolitionist, the worst thing 
would be for the Supreme Court to step in again.  In fact when Scalia 
said that about the Court striking down the death penalty, I thought 
“you’re baiting them. You just want to rev this up again.” So maybe 
this will all work out, but I hope not because of the Court. 
Professor Sudeall: It’s interesting. I think the death penalty is one of 
the areas where, you sort of alluded to this, there are sort of these 
renegade states that are repeat players that show up—Texas, of 
course being one of them. I teach capital punishment, and I think 
almost every case is a Texas or a Georgia case. But, the term that I 
was clerking, there were multiple cases where Texas got slapped 
down, and Justice Kennedy was often a big part of that. He wrote 
many of those. It’s interesting that, even to the extent this is 
becoming a more localized issue, at least he was willing to play that 
role of not letting things go too far. I’ll be curious to see, aside from 
this bigger question, whether the Court is at least playing that role 
and checking states that push back. 
Professor Lain: Now it’s Chief Justice Roberts who is in the 
position to play that role, and he has on occasion. So, in the Buck v. 
Davis case—that is the case where the defense has an expert, and the 
expert talks about future dangerousness and says, “Well, because 
he’s black there’s a higher chance that he’s going to be dangerous in 
the future.”  And it’s Chief Justice Roberts who writes the opinion in 
that case and says, “No, you can’t do that.”  He has a line in that 
12
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opinion where he says, “Some toxins are deadly in small doses.” That 
fits the death penalty so well on so many levels.  
And then you have the Madison case. That’s the one where you’ve 
got this capital defendant who can’t see, can’t walk without 
assistance. He’s incontinent. He can only recite the alphabet to the 
letter G. He’s got all of these things wrong with him, and Alabama is 
rushing to execute him. It goes up to the Supreme Court to see 
whether he’s competent to be executed. Who knows how it’s going to 
turn out, but from the oral arguments it’s pretty clear that Roberts is 
going to side with the libs on this. Now, it’s a really limited case. I 
don’t think it’s going to churn any doctrinal water there, but in super 
egregious cases will we have somebody who cares? That’s going to 
have to be Roberts, because I think the other four conservatives are 
like eh, that’s what you get. 
Professor Epps: I was just going to follow up on that and say that 
case, we don’t know for certain how it’s going to come out, but if 
that ends up being true, that might suggest that capital lawyers’ 
strategies of not bringing anything to the Court maybe is a bad one. 
Maybe you should try to get cases with really, really, really bad facts 
up there and say, “Hey, Chief Justice Roberts, do you really want to 
say this is okay?” The worst thing that happens is you lose, but 
they’re probably already going to be losing in the lower courts in 
light of all the recent nominees. I think that there’s some value in sort 
of forcing the Court’s hand and really saying, “Look, do you want to 
endorse this or not?” 
Professor Lain: On really egregious cases, I think you’re exactly 
right, yeah. Good point. 
Professor Sudeall: I want to transition. I don’t have a good segue to 
move from that to affirmative action— 
Professor Lain: Death penalty to affirmative action, easy. 
13
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Professor Sudeall: Gail, maybe you can start us off, and let people 
adapt over the next twenty seconds, to summarizing Justice 
Kennedy’s approach on affirmative action. You have five minutes. 
Professor Gail Heriot: Well, okay. The usual story here about 
Kennedy is that he started out as a reliable conservative on issues of 
racial preferences. To be sure, he had a fondness for articulating 
more pliable, softer-sounding legal standards than what you would 
find in Justice Scalia’s or Justice Thomas’s opinions. But still, when 
push comes to shove, he was voting with his more conservative 
colleagues in favor of race-neutral results, even in those cases where 
he was only concurring the judgment. In more recent years, however, 
according this usual story, he has made common cause with Justice 
Ginsberg, Justice Kagan, Justice Breyer, Justice Sotomayor, most 
notably in the second Fisher v. University of Texas case. 
Now, it’s true that this was hardly the first case where Justice 
Kennedy was seen as the swing Justice, but nevertheless, it was a 
race case. It was an affirmative action case, and that was considered 
to be much more unusual. People were asking why is that, what’s 
going on in this case?  
So, what did happen? According to some left-of-center 
commentators, he just got smart about the virtues of affirmative 
action. “We convinced him,” they might say. Alternatively, 
conservative commentators, some of them like to say that he fell prey 
to Washington disease, that disease that afflicts so many small-
government conservatives who find out they’re really not in favor of 
small government once they are in charge of things. Power can 
corrupt anyone, but there is a special corrupting influence that has an 
effect on believers in small government. Or to give it an even less 
flattering spin, conservatives with Washington disease start longing 
to impress the liberal press. 
I am actually not fond of any of those explanations. They’re 
obviously over simplifications, and they don’t have much of a law 
spin to them. Alas, I am not going to be able to give you a perfect 
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legal explanation for all of Kennedy’s opinions in the area of 
affirmative action, but for that matter I couldn’t give you a perfect 
legal explanation in any other area or for any other Justice. Once you 
start looking really closely at a line of cases by a particular Justice, 
they will all baffle you a little bit, so let me try to give you a slightly 
more law-focused perspective. 
First let me put my cards on the table here. I am a conservative, or 
a classical liberal if you will, with a bit of a libertarian streak, and 
that means that I’m generally sympathetic with Kennedy on 
affirmative action cases, the earlier opinions. I have sometimes found 
his softer, more pliable approach to be particularly appealing, and I 
would think the Parents Involved case that you mentioned a little 
earlier is one where I found the softer approach could be a better 
approach. On the other hand, the Fisher II decision I was 
disappointed in.  
By way of legal substance, it’s important to acknowledge that 
Kennedy has been completely consistent on the anti-formalism issue 
that has been brought up several times now, starting with his 1989 
concurrence in City of Richmond v. Croson. That was a case 
involving racial preferences in public contracting, set-asides based on 
public contracting. Kennedy, as always, applied his—[looking at 
Professor Epps] I liked your term—“relentless anti-formalism.” I 
think that’s a good term. I’m going to use that. 
He’s been inclined to a case-by-case approach to race 
discrimination generally, and he’s essentially saying that he trusts 
judges to conduct nuanced examinations of very complicated 
circumstances surrounding particular racial discriminatory policies, 
more or less free from rigid rules, and more or less free from any 
kind of doctrine beyond the very well-established doctrine of strict 
scrutiny, which he has continually referred back to. To be sure, like 
his conservative colleagues, his expressed view is that strict scrutiny 
must be applied no matter what race or what ethnicity is being 
affected. He’s made it clear in Croson and most of the later cases that 
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he believes that is a very demanding standard. But, he doesn’t want 
to declare that all race discrimination is unconstitutional, or even that 
all efforts to adjust for background societal discrimination in the past 
should be outlawed. Unlike Justice Scalia, unlike Justice Thomas, he 
wants to play it loose, case by case. 
I suppose I could stop there and say that naturally if someone’s 
going to play it loose, sooner or later they’re going to hit on a case 
where they’re going to take the other side of the issue, and that’s 
basically what the standard interpretation of Fisher II has been. 
Sooner or later, this was going to happen.  
I have to admit that these days I’m not a big fan of the anti-
formalist approach to race discrimination issues. Back in 1989 during 
the Croson case, (some of you weren’t born then), I would have been 
with Kennedy and said, hey, we want to play this loose, case by case. 
But after a few years of thinking about it, I tended to agree with 
Scalia’s position that the presumption against race discrimination 
needs to be overwhelming.  Otherwise, it eventually becomes just a 
political decision.  
The trouble with attributing Kennedy’s decision in Fisher II just to 
anti-formalism is that I have not been able to come up with a good 
explanation as to why Fisher II itself would be the exception for 
Kennedy. He really does seem to have drifted toward a position that 
is more accommodating to racial discrimination that favors under-
represented minorities. So maybe the nonlegal explanations for 
Kennedy’s change of heart in an outcome-determinative case were 
right. But you asked for sort of the standard explanation, so that’s it. 
Professor Sudeall: So, I was going to ask, what explains then—
could it be the sort of threading-the-needle approach, this sort of 
holding others to this high standard, but if you meet that standard, not 
wanting to go so far as to say you can never— 
Professor Heriot: Yeah, but you know I think even Scalia might say 
that he can think of a case where you wouldn’t want to say, “This is 
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unconstitutional.” The hypothetical everyone likes to use in this 
situation is the prison riot case, where you’ve got a race riot between 
prisoners and it’s a matter of seconds, you’ve got to move very 
quickly, you’re trying to save lives, and you decide to order the 
prison guards separate them by race. Of course, probably somebody 
isn’t fighting on the side of his skin color. The prisoners know each 
other, and they know who’s on what side; the guards don’t.  It’s 
basically a race riot, but it’s not a “perfect” race riot. You separate 
them out that way and somebody’s going to get beaten up. But, 
nevertheless, even though prison guards have discriminated on the 
basis of race at that moment, I don’t think anybody’s going to argue 
that the prison guards should have conducted a nuanced examination. 
They had to act quickly, and they did. That’s the standard 
hypothetical that law professors tend to use. 
The thing about Kennedy, though, that I thought was interesting is 
that in the Croson case, he was not completely dedicated to his anti-
formalism. He actually articulated his rule—he was pliable about his 
pliability in that case. What he said was that in discussing Scalia’s 
approach, he was not convinced of the need for it at this time. That’s 
kind of interesting. Then you have to wonder if he is an example then 
of what Scalia was talking about in connection with the need for 
strong rules in the area of race discrimination. If you could take 
Kennedy’s 1989 self and say, “Let’s look at how things have 
progressed toward identity politics by 2018. Would you have wanted 
to take a slightly more formal or at least a slightly stronger approach 
to prevent that from happening (including to prevent your own 
backsliding)?”  
There are a number of problems with a loose approach to race 
discrimination cases. The notion of “I will know an unconstitutional 
race discrimination situation when I see it” is not a lot of guidance to 
give to the public actors who are governed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment or federal actors governed by the Fifth Amendment. 
Everyone naturally will believe, “What I think is a good idea, I bet 
the Supreme Court’s going to think it’s a good idea, too, because I’m 
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a smart person.” So, it’s basically no guidance at all. It’s telling these 
actors that they should do what they think is the right thing to do, and 
not surprisingly after the Croson case, which again is a case about 
public contracting and set-asides, a cottage industry got started up on 
how to get around the Croson case. Instead of getting less in the way 
of racial preference in contracting, we got more. I don’t think that 
was what either O’Connor, who wrote the majority opinion, or 
Kennedy thought they were getting. I don’t think they expected that 
to happen.  
Another problem of course is that when you have an anti-formal 
approach, it’s not just you that gets to decide what is constitutional 
and what is not. Although, I’ll admit that in Kennedy’s case, he got to 
decide that an awful lot. He was often the swing Justice, but he’s not 
going to be on the Supreme Court very much longer. What happens 
is, there are other justices and their view of what is justified will be 
different and that’s what happened in the Grutter case, where 
Kennedy ends up in the minority. 
In that case, much to his disappointment, O’Connor, joined by the 
left-of-center bloc, finds the University of Michigan Law School’s 
very large preferential treatment based on race was constitutional. 
Basically, the law school had been treating African-American and 
Hispanic applicants to the law school who’d gotten a 3.0 GPA the 
same as they would treat an Asian or white applicant who got a 4.0, 
which is really quite a difference, all other things being equal. That 
was very much not what Kennedy wanted. Justice O’Connor’s 
opinion was basically as long as you avoid setting aside a certain 
number of seats as they did in the Bakke case back in 1978, or as long 
as you avoid a certain number of points as was done in the Gratz 
case, which was the other University of Michigan case that was 
decided by the Supreme Court at the same time, they were willing to 
put up with that. O’Connor wrote an opinion that essentially said, 
“Look, we’re applying strict scrutiny, but we’re going to defer to the 
university,” which is kind of an odd notion, the notion of deference 
and strict scrutiny. Ordinarily, that would have been considered 
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opposites. You can’t defer and have strict scrutiny. Kennedy 
dissented. 
That’s the problem with anti-formalism. If you trust the other 
judges, if you think they’re going to decide the way you’re going to 
decide, then I guess it’s fine. But, that’s a problem. I think again 
O’Connor really thought she was applying the brakes lightly by 
deciding one case in favor of the university, Grutter, one case in 
favor of the plaintiffs, Gratz. She dropped the line in the opinion that 
in twenty-five years that there may be a different approach that she’s 
going to want to take. I think that maybe, just maybe, by then 
Kennedy understood that the light approach was probably not going 
to lead to less consideration of race. It was probably going to lead to 
more, and there’s plenty of empirical evidence right now, even with 
the University of Michigan itself, that yes, the level of preferences 
got larger immediately afterwards. That brings us, I guess, pretty 
much up to the more recent years and to Fisher, but— 
Professor Sudeall: So I’m curious. I think you mentioned earlier that 
you maybe can’t explain, or you don’t know why the switch from 
Fisher I to Fisher II. I’m curious about your thoughts about Fisher II, 
but also how does that fit in to your description of Kennedy and 
pliability? How do you see that playing into how he ended up 
deciding in Fisher II to uphold the— 
Professor Heriot: I think it’s really hard to explain Fisher II. Let’s 
start out with Fisher I here. Obviously, people who were in favor of 
race-preferential admissions were pretty pleased with the Grutter 
decision, and at the same time, those who wanted race-neutral 
admissions were pretty disappointed. It’s very difficult to answer, 
“Where do we go from here?” Lawsuits like that are very expensive 
to maintain. It’s very hard to get funding in order to bring another 
lawsuit if you’re dealing with loosey-goosey law, and moreover not 
just loosey-goosey, but Grutter’s pretty strong with deference point.  
So along comes the University of Texas case, which was pretty odd 
on its facts and maybe one that wasn’t going to be easily 
19
et al.: Panel 4: Criminal Procedure and Affirmative Action
Published by Reading Room,
996 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:Supp. 
reproducible. In the University of Texas, case, the University of 
Texas had actually been operating under very different rules prior to 
Grutter. There had been a decision by the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals that essentially made it impossible for universities in the 
Fifth Circuit to have race-preferential admissions, because it had 
held, anticipating the Supreme Court would go the other way—in the 
Hopwood case it’s called—that race-preferential admissions are 
simply unconstitutional. So, Texas had to stop using them. 
At the time Grutter was decided, Texas could have just turned 
around and said, “Okay, now we’re going back to what we did in the 
past,” but in the meantime, the Texas legislature had passed a law 
that had instead required that in Texas, anyone who graduated in the 
top 10% of a Texas high school would automatically be admitted into 
the University of Texas, regardless of what their SAT score was (or 
regardless of whether they’d even taken the SAT, I believe). The 
University of Texas had been bragging that actually this solution was 
very effective, and it was getting the school as much racial diversity 
as it had under its previous methods of dealing with diversity issues. 
So, Texas was telling its students, telling everyone, “We’re doing 
great, we’re doing fine, we don’t need race-preferential admissions.” 
Then, within twenty-four hours after the Grutter decision was 
decided, it came out and said, “We’re bringing back race-preferential 
admissions.” 
That actually was a very tiny decision in the sense that it only 
affected a tiny number of students, because the Texas 10% solution, 
that was a law, and the school was not in a position to change that. It 
actually was not very popular with the administration at the 
University of Texas, but it was a law, so Texas had very little 
maneuvering room there. Nevertheless, it brought back race-
preferential admissions for the small number of discretionary 
admissions that it had. In general, the top 10%, that pretty much fills 
up the school, but it had a few discretionary positions. So that then 
led to the Fisher I case. Oral argument comes, and the case is 
pending before the court for a very, very long time, much longer than 
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usual. It was argued in the early fall, and the decision didn’t come out 
until the late spring. It was this little, puny thirteen-pager—by 
Kennedy, of course—basically adopting what he’d said in his earlier 
dissent in Grutter, saying, “Well, we said we would defer to the 
university, but we really only meant we would defer a little bit, and 
we really only meant on the compelling interest side of things, and 
we’re certainly not going to defer on the question of whether or not a 
particular solution is narrowly tailored.” 
So, a lot of the language was tougher than it had been before.  
Nevertheless, the Court didn’t decide the issue of whether Texas’s 
policy was narrowly tailored because it just remanded back to figure 
the issue out without any sort of deference. But the thought was 
they’re going to get tough if the issue comes back up in Fisher II.   
But that isn’t what happened. Instead, when Fisher II came up for 
a decision on whether or not this really is narrowly tailored, Kennedy 
sided with the left-of-center bloc. The trouble is, this was not really a 
great case for that. If he’s going to defect from the conservative 
group, really in some ways Grutter would have been a better case for 
that.  
Texas was really unclear about what their motivation for this 
policy. It kept changing its mind. It had already said that it had plenty 
of diversity, and it was really only getting a tiny number of additional 
minority students in this way. I think the number was probably thirty-
three out of a class of 10,000. Even so, Texas had, for example, about 
20% Hispanic students, so it was very hard for them to argue lack of 
critical mass in this case. It was much easier for Michigan to argue 
that they didn’t have a sufficient number for critical mass. 
Professor Sudeall: I want to make sure that we do have enough time 
for Q and A. I’ll just add —and I can’t possibly try to wrap 
everything together—but two points that I think, at least when I think 
of some of the affirmative action cases, I think the dignity piece that 
we talked about so much, I think that part of Justice Kennedy’s 
thought around— I think there’s a dignity piece in some of his 
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writing, particularly in Parents Involved. I think it really offended 
him for people to be defined solely by their race. I think that offended 
some sense of personal dignity. I like to think that informed part of 
his thinking. Obviously a very different kind of dignity, but thinking 
about this inherent humanity or that we—I think that offended his 
sense of dignity. 
The other thought that I have is, the other point I made about being 
careful or threading the needle. It struck me that Fisher’s the case—if 
this doesn’t work, nothing will work. It was very narrow. In some 
sense maybe why it didn’t result in big results. Maybe, again, I’m not 
here to read his mind, maybe there was also some recognition that to 
foreclose even that plan would have been the end and he was not 
willing to go there. I was going to ask, maybe in the Q and A it’ll 
come up, where do we go from here? But I want to make sure that I 
have a chance for somebody else to ask a question if anyone has a 
question on any of these topics in our remaining time. 
Professor Stephen Griffin: Steve Griffin, Tulane Law School. I’m 
sorry I didn’t hear the whole thing— 
Professor Sudeall: Could you move a little closer to the mic? 
Professor Griffin: Yeah. I’m sorry I didn’t hear the whole—how 
about this—the presentation on affirmative action but I just wanted to 
point out, especially for the students, that just keep in mind that prior 
to Grutter, Texas couldn’t use any form of racial preferences because 
the Fifth Circuit was existing in an anti-Bakke bubble because of the 
Hopwood case, in which the Fifth Circuit ruled that the Bakke case 
was not the law. 
Professor Heriot: Yeah, we did talk about this. 
Professor Griffin: Okay, sorry. But that might have been one of 
their reasons to explain why they decided to go back to the drawing 
board and look at affirmative action again. 
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Professor Heriot: But remember, they couldn’t go back to the 
drawing board, because the statute wouldn’t let them. 
Esmat Hanano: Esmat Hanano from the Law Review. I’m in 
criminal procedure right now, so forgive me if this isn’t going to 
make sense as a question, but some of the opinions that we’re reading 
from Justice Scalia, there’s the call back to interpreting the Fourth 
Amendment under traditional, originalist understandings. In the 
substantive due process analysis Justice Kennedy uses, he rejects 
Justice Scalia’s call for that similar type of analysis. I think of 
Michael H. v. Gerald D. where Justice Kennedy writes separately 
saying, “Agree, but not with that method.” But in the criminal 
procedure side, he doesn’t do that. He kind of goes along with Justice 
Scalia. Am I thinking of that correctly? Is there a way to reconcile 
that or are they just two ships passing in the night that don’t have 
anything to do with each other? 
Professor Epps: My sense is that he’s not always with Justice Scalia 
on the sort of original methods approach. Like in the Fourth 
Amendment context, Justice Scalia really wants to sort of bring in a 
new way of thinking that’s premised on property rights, and that’s 
something that Justice Kennedy was not totally onboard with that 
project. More generally, Justice Scalia made a lot of arguments that 
said, “Look, this is really what the Constitution required,” and Justice 
Kennedy just sort of waves his hand at those kind of arguments. I 
think I see his approach as being more sort of, “Fourth Amendment, 
let’s think a little bit about privacy. Eight Amendment, let’s think of 
evolving standards of decency rather than let’s drill down to what the 
original meaning was.” 
Esmat Hanano: Okay, thank you. 
Professor Lain: I’ll just chime in a little bit, too. When I think of 
Justice Scalia on criminal procedure, there are some places where he 
has some great lines. And it can seem so principled, but my mind 
always goes back to the Hudson case. That’s the exclusionary rule 
case where the court says exclusionary rule doesn’t apply to knock 
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and announce violations. That in itself isn’t particularly remarkable. 
But what he did in that particular case, is he talked about the 
exclusionary rule and, he said, “In dicta, we said the exclusionary 
rule was constitutionally required,” and he cited Mapp. 
The problem with that is that when Mapp said that—and it did—
there were some pretty important words on the front.  Those words 
were “We hold that.”  So here’s this opinion where he lops off the 
words “we hold that” in a decision he hates and calls it dicta. I’m 
just—it’s hard for me to get past moves like that. 
Professor Epps: That goes to the sort of substance-remedy 
distinction. He really, Justice Scalia thought that the Fourth 
Amendment—he cared a lot about the substance but wasn’t at all 
clear, to me, how he thought it should be enforced. Wasn’t a big fan 
of the exclusionary rule and wasn’t a big fan of civil damages 
actions. 
Professor Lain: It’s just really hard to take him seriously when he’s 
all “Framers and original meaning” and then does something blatant 
like that that’s not principled at all. I’m just—you lost me at hello. 
Professor Jonathan Adler: Jonathan Adler, Case Western. I was 
wondering if any of the panelists wanted to explore something related 
to Justice Kennedy and the death penalty. As was discussed, he 
seemed to be very concerned about who is subject to the death 
penalty, but especially looking at his AEDPA jurisprudence, or the 
decisions he would join in the AEDPA context, he didn’t seem to 
have much concern about why people might be subject to the death 
penalty. That is to say that he was generally a fairly consistent vote 
for fairly strict enforcement of AEDPA. That may have been correct 
as a matter of the meaning and proper application of AEDPA, but it 
does seem to be in tension with his opinions in the Eighth 
Amendment cases where he’s concerned with who is being executed, 
particularly given that a decent number of these AEDPA cases 
involve ineffective assistance of counsel claims or actual innocence 
claims. It seems to be if you’re mentally disabled or you committed 
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the crime as a child, you can’t be executed. But if you’re innocent, 
well maybe you can. 
Professor Lain:  I agree. Why is it the case that executing an 
innocent person is not super bad for human dignity?  But I do think 
his decisions on the “who” also went to the “why.” They were deeply 
interconnected.  So when he’s talking about how society can fall into 
raw brutality, and so it’s super important that we’re not executing 
offenders who are sixteen years old and seventeen years old when 
they commit their offense or that have some sort of intellectual 
disability, there you can see how the why is deeply connected with 
the who. I have to say that I found that his blind spot, and I’m subject 
to pushback on this, but the blind spot that I see was in the endgame. 
That explains the habeas decisions. That explains the lethal injection 
decisions. That explains the denial of the stays, even when they were 
on issues that we otherwise would have thought he cared about. 
Maybe for him, it’s a “well, if you get to the end it’s just going to be 
ugly, I have nothing to say about this.”  Hard to say.  
But even in the lethal injection context, it was really interesting in 
Baze v. Rees in 2008, where the Court upholds the use of a paralytic, 
and Kennedy is a part of that. The Court there says the paralytic is 
good for the dignity of the process, and I thought did they need to do 
that to get Kennedy’s vote? Perhaps, but if you cared about dignity, 
maybe you would ask the offenders whether they think it furthers 
dignity in their dying process because clearly they don’t think does—
they’re the ones challenging this. So here Kennedy was willing to say 
the dignity of how death looked was worth more than the risk that 
you were actually torturing someone and just couldn’t see it, which I 
would think would be really problematic for someone who actually 
cares about human dignity.  That’s hard to make sense of other than 
as a blind spot to the endgame piece. 
Professor Epps: I was thinking a lot about the EDPA stuff this 
morning, because I think it is one exception to my thesis that he was 
more concerned with bottom lines than procedures, because that is a 
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place where he really actually ratchets up the restrictions on federal 
habeas, and it’s also sort of inconsistent with his larger vision of 
federal courts get to decide a lot of stuff. There’s a debate about what 
the deferential standard of review should be under EDPA and he 
actually thinks it should be fairly deferential. The best answer I’ve 
been able to come up with is that, for him, those cases are really 
largely about federalism, and he really thinks federal habeas litigation 
is very intrusive, and very burdensome on state governments, and he 
thinks there’s often not very much going on there. 
Professor Sudeall: We’re going to be talking about federalism later. 
I’ll just add one quick comment, and then we have to break to make 
sure we don’t go too far off schedule, but at the risk of trying too 
hard, I’ll try to draw another connection with your description of 
dignity— 
Professor Lain: You did a good job. 
Professor Sudeall: —I think is interesting because it reminds me of 
thinking whose conception of dignity is it? Is it his version or, like 
you said, the individuals at issue? Because the point that I was 
making earlier about his discussion of the sort of offensiveness 
around defining people solely by their race—when I was writing 
about rights and identity, I talked about how you could use that 
language to tie it to the multiracial movement of people who think 
about race in a very different way. I think a lot of individuals would 
say that race does, in fact, define your experience. I think for a lot of 
people of color that is very true, because it affects every aspect of 
their life. Yet, he had this very different idea of I perceive that as 
being insulting to dignity. Maybe there’s this larger question of 
dignity for whom. 
Professor Lain: I have to give you props because I was thinking, 
okay affirmative action and death penalty, I’m just not quite sure 
what the connection is, but I think you found it. 
Professor Sudeall: And on that note, we will end. 
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